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I RECENT CASES I
Asserting Jurisdiction Over the Providers
of Human Donor Organs: State of
Missouri ex rel. Wichita Falls General
Hospital v. Adolph'
Roger M. Baron*
Hospitals making organs available do so for moral and
humanitarian reasons . ... If the threat of having to defend a
potential malpractice action, meritorious or otherwise, in a far
distant jurisdiction serves to cause even one hospital to refuse
to provide an organ necessary to keep a Missouri resident alive
the results far outweigh the inconvenience of requiring Missouri
residents to sue in the hospital's home forum.2
I. Synopsis
In an unprecedented decision, the Eastern District of the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals refused to allow a Missouri trial court to
assert jurisdiction over a Texas hospital in a malpractice action. The
hospital had allegedly misstated the blood type of the heart as type
A when it was in fact type B. The recipient ultimately died and a
wrongful death action ensued in the forum of the recipient. This
manuscript reviews this significant decision for its public policy hold-
ing and for its jurisdictional analysis. Additional insight as to the
finality of the opinion and as to the exhaustion of appellate review in
Missouri state courts is also provided.
* Mr. Baron is an Assistant Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law in
Houston. He received both his B.S. ('73) and J.D. ('76) degrees from the University of
Missouri at Columbia. Professor Baron teaches Civil Procedure, Family Law and Professional
Responsibility. Prior to teaching at South Texas, Professor Baron practiced law in the state of
Missouri for nine years.
The author wishes to thank Sarah Baron and Franda Blaylock for their assistance.
I. 728 S.W.2d 604 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (petition for writ of certiorari is presently
pending in the United States Supreme Court).
2. Id. at 610.
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II. Introduction
On March 10, 1987, the Eastern District of the Missouri Court
of Appeals made permanent its writ of prohibition against a trial
court which had attempted to assert jurisdiction over a Texas hospi-
tal in a wrongful death action stemming from an unsuccessful heart
transplant.3 The hospital in question, Wichita Falls General Hospi-
tal, had no agents and transacted no business in the state of Mis-
souri. It did, however, notify Southwest Organ Bank, a not-for-profit
corporation in Dallas, Texas, of the availability of a human heart
suitable for transplant. The Southwest Organ Bank in turn notified
transplant facilities throughout the country of such availability. The
available heart had apparently been described as being of blood type
A. A cardiothoracic surgeon and hospital in St. Louis were advised
of the available heart and a transplant team flew to Wichita Falls,
harvested the heart, and returned to St. Louis.4 In the process of
implanting the heart, doctors discovered that the donor heart was in
fact of blood type B. The recipient's own heart had already been
removed and since no other heart was available, the transplant was
completed. The recipient lived for some time, but began rejecting the
heart, and another transplant of the correct blood type was per-
formed. Shortly thereafter the recipient died.
Subsequently, a wrongful death action in the Missouri trial
court ensued against the surgeon, the St. Louis hospital and the
Wichita Falls General Hospital. The trial court denied the Texas
hospital's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and a
preliminary order in prohibition was entered by the Eastern District
of the Missouri Court of Appeals.5 The reported opinion which
makes the writ of prohibition permanent is State of Missouri ex rel
Wichita Falls General Hospital v. Adolf." Further review by the
Missouri appellate courts was exhausted on May 19, 1987, when the
Missouri Supreme Court denied an application to transfer.7
3. Id.
4. These facts, as set forth in the opinion, were established through affidavits. 728
S.W.2d at 605-06.
5. This court, which sits in St. Louis, was formerly known as the St. Louis Court of
Appeals. It was reorganized as the Eastern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals effective
January 2, 1979. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 477.050 (Vernon 1987).
6. 728 S.W.2d 604 (Mo. App. E.D. 1987). This case also illustrates the effectiveness of
extraordinary writs, such as prohibition, in securing immediate appellate review of the initial
action by the trial court in deciding to retain jurisdiction. See also World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
7. 728 S.W.2d at 604. Prior to requesting transfer directly by the Missouri Supreme
Court, the losing party is required to seek a rehearing and/or transfer to the Missouri Su-
preme Court by the district which rendered the decision. Mo. Sup. Ct. Rules 83.02, 83.03 and
728 S.W.2d 604 (Mo. CT. App. 1987)
III. Public Policy
The Missouri court resisted the imposition of jurisdiction on a
number of grounds. Most dramatically, jurisdiction was declined be-
cause of the state court's policy concern of "protecting the life and
health of its citizens." The court recognized that the demand for
donor organs exceeds the supply9 and the possibility that hospitals
may in the future refuse to provide such organs for Missouri resi-
dents. Citing Missouri's recently-enacted good samaritan law,1" the
court found that Missouri's public policy restricts the normal availa-
bility of some tort concepts in "humanitarian medical treatment situ-
ations where human life is at-stake."" The court acknowledged that
its decision did not automatically preclude recovery for the plaintiff;
rather, it required that she seek recovery in the Texas courts. 2 Sig-
nificantly, the court recognized that "transplant surgery is still in its
early years" and that mistakes and negligence do occur.' 3 Although
retention of jurisdiction arguably would make hospitals more careful,
that argument is premised on "the supposition that only negligent
hospitals" are sued 14 and overlooks the fact that organs are provided
for humanitarian reasons and assertion of jurisdiction would deter
the willingness of hospitals to make such organs available in the
future.'
The Texas hospital did receive payment of $1159.80 from the
Southwest Organ Bank; however, the payment was only a partial re-
imbursement of actual expenses incurred by the Texas hospital in
evaluating and preserving the organ. 6 The Texas hospital was under
no legal requirement to attempt to make this or other organs availa-
ble; its motivation was solely for moral and humanitarian reasons."7
84.17. Grounds warranting transfer and consideration by the Missouri Supreme Court include:
I) general interest or importance of the question involved; 2) reexamination of existing law;
and 3) the decision of the appellate court is contrary to a previous decision of an appellate
court. Mo. Sup. Ct. Rules 83.02 and 83.03.
In Adolph, the Eastern District denied rehearing and/or transfer on April 9, 1987. 728
S.W.2d 604. At the time of the preparation of this manuscript, no effort had yet been made to
seek a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court by the losing party; however, such review
may still be sought.
8. 728 S.W.2d at 609.
9. Id.
10. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.037 (1986) (cited at 728 S.W.2d at 610).
II. 728 S.W.2d at 610.
12. Id. at 609.
13. Id. at 610.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 609.
17. Id. at 610.
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The lack of a profit or commercial motive by the Texas hospital
made it easier for the Missouri court to find a lack of sufficient mini-
mum contacts to satisfy due process;'" however, the public policy no-
tions in the opinion are so strong that it appears that the court would
not have been influenced otherwise even if a profit had been realized.
The Adolph court glossed over the payment issue, relying only on
affidavits which the parties "tacitly agreed" 19 the court could con-
sider. There apparently had been no discovery on the issue of pay-
ment and there certainly was no adversarial hearing.2"
IV. Purposeful Availment
Although Missouri has a long-arm statute21 to facilitate the as-
sertion of jurisdiction over non-residents, the analysis and holding by
the Adolph court did not involve statutory construction of Missouri's
long-arm statute. The Missouri Supreme Court previously inter-
preted the statute to extend jurisdiction to the fullest possible limits
assertable under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.2 2 Such an interpretation is consistent with similar interpreta-
tions made by courts in other states2" and avoids situations where
non-residents who may have " 'minimum contacts' galore slip
through the fingers at the end of the long-arm." 2 '
Clearly, the Missouri court in Adolph rested its jurisdictional
analysis on the due process guidelines set forth by the U.S. Supreme
Court in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington,25 which re-
quires "certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that main-
tenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play
18. Id. at 607. The court distinguished McGee v. International Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220
(1957), on the basis that marketing in the forum in McGee, either directly or indirectly, re-
moved the unreasonableness of subjecting the corporation to suit. The lack of a commercial
motive in Adolph also serves to distinguish it from the 1985 version of McGee, Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), in which a Michigan resident who had never visited
Florida was held subject to the jurisdiction of the Florida long-arm statute by virtue of his
participation in a long term (20 year) franchise agreement with Burger King, which was head-
quartered in Miami.
19. 728 S.W.2d at 609.
20. Id. at 605 n.2. See also discussion infra note 38 concerning the adversarial role
played by the co-defendants in this proceeding.
21. Mo. REV. STAT. § 506.500 (1986).
22. State ex rel. Deere & Co. v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Mo. 1970) (en banc).
23. See. e.g., U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977). See also
Carlson, General Jurisdiction and the Exercise of in Personam Jurisdiction Under the Texas
Long-Arm Statute, 28 S. TEx. L. REV. 307 (1986).
24. Jim Fox Enterprises, Inc. v. Air France, 664 F.2d 63, 64 (5th Cir. 1981), reh'g, 705
F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983).
25. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
728 S.W.2d 604 (Mo. CT. App. 1987)
and substantial justice."26 The Adolph court found both that the
Texas hospital lacked "minimum contacts '2 7 and further that the
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" would be
offended.1
8
A number of significant decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court
have emphasized the importance of evolving standards, such as the
"purposeful availment" requirement seen in the 1958 case of Hanson
v. Denckla.2 9 In Hanson, the requirement served to insulate a Penn-
sylvania trustee from the jurisdiction of the Florida state court be-
cause the trustee had not purposefully availed itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum state.30 The "purposeful
availment" analysis of Hanson v. Denckla was also useful in distin-
guishing McGee v. International Life3 which upheld the assertion
of jurisdiction over a non-resident insurance company with very lim-
ited contacts, but in a commercial setting.
A 1980 version of Hanson v. Denckla places continued emphasis
on the "purposeful availment" criteria. In World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 2 a local retailer and a regional distributor of an
automobile sold in New York were found not to have availed them-
selves of the laws of Oklahoma. The automobile was involved in an
accident in Oklahoma and a products liability suit against the manu-
facturer, importer, regional distributor and local retailer followed.
The Court held that the regional distributor and local retailer (on
the East Coast) could not reasonably anticipate being haled into
Oklahoma state court.33
The Supreme Court further refined the minimum contacts test
five years later, holding that a "random," "fortuitous" or "attenu-
ated" contact or the "unilateral activity of another party" does not
constitute sufficient contacts with the forum state.3 4 It is the defend-
ant's conduct and his actions "himself that are needed to create 'a
substantial connection' with the forum state."35
In this regard, the Adolph court found that the contact between
the Texas hospital and Missouri was "random" and "fortuitous" 36
26. Id. at 316.
27. 728 S.W.2d at 609.
28. Id. at 610.
29. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 44
30. Id. at 253.
31. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). McGee was decided one year before the Hanson case.
32. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
33. Id. at 298-99.
34. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (emphasis on original).
35. Id. (emphasis is that of the Court).
36. 728 S.W.2d at 609.
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since any statea" might have received the heart. The court found that
the unilateral activity of the Missouri hospital and surgeon caused
the heart to go to Missouri. 38 The court also noted that the alleged
negligence (misstating the blood type to the Southwest Organ Bank)
occurred prior to any knowledge of Missouri involvement. s9
The Adolph court recognized that in the area of products liabil-
ity, the "minimum contacts" analysis appears to be less stringent.40
Nonetheless, the less stringent tests for products liability cases and
the "stream of commerce" were not applicable, since the procure-
ment and distribution of human organs for transplant had been spe-
cifically declared by Missouri statute"' to be the rendition of a ser-
vice and not a sale of a product. 2 The Adolph court was content to
rely on the absence of a "purposeful availment" finding by the fortu-
itous and random manner in which the heart found its way to Mis-
souri, and did not care to fully explore other theories and arguments
in favor of the assertion of jurisdiction. '
The lack of minimum contacts finding in Adolph can not be
viewed in a vacuum, however, for the latter portion of the opinion is
fully devoted to the public policy reasons against assertion of juris-
diction." In a neat and technical application of the second portion of
the International Shoe criteria, 6 the Adolph court concluded that
public policy prevented the additional required finding that the as-
sertion of jurisdiction over the Texas hospital would satisfy "fair
play and substantial justice.""'
37. Although not part of the reported opinion, it was apparently revealed to the Adolph
court at oral argument that the body from which the heart was removed also provided other
donor organs. These organs were harvested by other surgeons and taken to several locations,
including Texas and Tennessee. Telephone interview with attorney Edward Crites, co-counsel
for Wichita Falls General Hospital (June 26, 1987).
38. 728 S.W.2d at 609. In an anomalous twist, the Missouri surgeon and Missouri hos-
pital which were co-defendants vigorously opposed the Texas hospital's efforts to resist the
jurisdiction of the Missouri court. Id. at 605 n.l. In fact, the effort to show that the Texas
hospital received a monetary payment as partial reimbursement for its actual expenses appar-
ently was lead by the co-defendants and not the plaintiff in the wrongful death action for the
purpose of keeping the Texas hospital in the suit. Telephone interview with attorney Edward
Crites, co-counsel for Wichita Falls General Hospital (June 26, 1987).
39. 728 S.W.2d at 609.
40. Id. at 608 (citing Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 107 S.
Ct. 1026 (1987)). See also World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98, in which the Court
recognized a broader realm of exposure for the manufacturer or distributor of a product at-
tempting to serve a larger market than a regional dealer and distributor.
41. Mo. REV. STAT. § 431.069 (1986).
42. 728 S.W.2d at 608.
43. The court stated: "We do not find that sufficient minimum contacts are present here
to require the exploration of additional factors." Id. at 609.
44. See supra notes 8-20 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
46. 728 S.W.2d at 610.
728 S.W.2d 604 (Mo. CT. App. 1987)
V. Conclusion
In this new age of transplant surgery, the Adolph case is cer-
tainly destined to be viewed as a landmark decision. The holding
clearly and boldly pronounces a defensible public policy against the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over the provider of human donor
organs in the forum of the recipient. Perhaps even more important,
however, is a recognition of what the Adolph court did not and could
not hold - that such providers would be immune from suits alto-
gether.47 The fact remains that the plaintiff in Adolph may still liti-
gate in the forum of the provider. What impact, if any, such aggres-
sive action by similar plaintiffs may have on the voluntary
preservation of donor organs for transplant remains to be seen. At
the very least, Adolph has helped to give such providers the home
court advantage in subsequent malpractice litigation.
47. Compare the following: "The cases which come before us in the malpractice area
reflect that generally in such actions every facility and doctor having any connection with the




the Professional Degree: Hodge v. Hodge,
513 Pa. 264, 520 A.2d 15 (1986).*
I. Introduction
Every divorce proceeding involves the issue of equitable distri-
bution of the marital estate. Recently, the courts in a number of
jurisdictions have considered whether a professional degree or li-
cense' earned during the marriage and the resulting increased earn-
ing capacity are marital assets subject to equitable distribution or
alimony. This issue is especially important when the parties have not
accumulated any other marital assets at the time of separation and
when one spouse has contributed both financially and otherwise to
the other spouse's degree. In Hodge v. Hodge,' the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court affirmed that portion of the superior court's decision
which held that a medical degree and the potential for increased
earning capacity attained with the degree are not marital property
subject to equitable distribution under the Pennsylvania Divorce
Code.3 By an evenly divided vote,4 however, the court affirmed the
lower court's decision to consider the value of the advanced degree in
awarding long-term alimony made in lieu of equitable distribution
when no assets were available for division.
II. Hodge v. Hodge: The Lower Courts
Dr. Arthur Hodge and Patricia Hodge were married in 1966.
During the marriage, Mrs. Hodge accompanied her husband through
an army enlistment and then to the University of Guadalajara, Mex-
ico, where Arthur attended medical school. Upon the couple's return
to the United States, Arthur enrolled in a Hospital Fifth Pathway
program at a hospital in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, while Patricia
* In order to reward outstanding legal writing, the staff of the Dickinson Law Review has
elected to publish annually one casenote submitted in the Dickinson Law Review Summer
Casenote Writing Competition. The research associated with this note was conducted by John
M. Suender, 1987-88 Notes Editor.
I. For purposes of this Casenote, "degree" refers to a professional degree or license.
2. Hodge v. Hodge, 513 Pa. 264, 520 A.2d 15 (1986).
3. 23 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 101-801 (Purdon Supp. 1986) ("Divorce Code").
4. Justice Larsen dissented and filed an opinion. Justice Hutchinson concurred in part,
dissented in part, and filed an opinion in which Justice Papadakos joined. Justice McDermott
did not participate in the decision.
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returned with the couple's child to a small house in Schuylkill
County. Two years and two more children later, Arthur received his
license to practice medicine. At about the same time, Dr. Hodge in-
formed his wife that he was unable to continue their fourteen-year
marital relationship.5 Although the couple had little else, Dr.
Hodge's salary was $52,000 per year plus certain fringe benefits, and
the gross income of his practice was $300,000 per year at the time of
the divorce.'
Mrs. Hodge's claims for alimony and equitable distribution
were heard first by a Master. Both parties filed exceptions to the
Master's findings. The Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
awarded long-term alimony to Mrs. Hodge; payments were to con-
tinue for 14 years until the youngest child reached majority. Both
parties appealed the decision. The issue on appeal was whether Mrs.
Hodge was entitled to any compensation for her contribution to her
husband's medical degree. Mrs. Hodge argued that the lower court
should have declared that the medical degree was property and di-
vided the value of the medical education equitably in order to reflect
that her contributions to his education had substantially increased
his earning capacity."
On appeal, Dr. Hodge argued that the Divorce Code only pro-
vided for rehabilitative alimony 8 and that the lower court had erred
in awarding Mrs. Hodge long-term alimony based upon his earning
potential. The superior court rejected Mrs. Hodge's argument and
held that the value of the degree and Dr. Hodge's increased earning
capacity did not constitute marital property subject to equitable dis-
tribution.9 The court did, however, interpret the Divorce Code to
5. Hodge, 513 Pa. at 267, 520 A.2d at 15-16.
6. Hodge v. Hodge, 337 Pa. Super. 151, 163, 486 A.2d 951, 959 (1984).
7. Id. at 155, 486 A.2d at 952.
8. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 501 (Purdon Supp. 1986) states in part:
(c) Unless the ability of the party seeking the alimony to provide for his or
her reasonable needs through employment is substantially diminished by reason
of age, physical, mental or emotional condition, custody of minor children, or
other compelling impediment to gainful employment, the court in ordering ali-
mony shall limit the duration of the order to a period of time which is reasonable
for the purpose of allowing the party seeking alimony to meet his or her reasona-
ble needs by:
(I) obtaining appropriate employment; or
(2) developing an appropriate employable skill.
9. The court cites In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978), for
this proposition. In Graham, the court states:
An educational degree, such as an M.B.A., is simply not emcompassed [sic]
even by the broad views of the concept of "property." It does not have an ex-
change value or any objective transferable value on an open market. It is per-
sonal to the holder. It terminates on death of the holder and is not inheritable. It
DIVORCE
provide for long-term alimony to compensate her for her contribution
to her husband's degree and his increased earning power.
III. Equitable Distribution in Other Jurisdictions
Whether a supporting spouse is entitled to equitable relief inci-
dent to a divorce for contributions to the student spouse's education
has caused much confusion in the courts. The issue is particularly
troublesome when, as in Hodge, the marriage has produced no other
valuable assets for distribution. At least three different approaches to
the problem have emerged. One line of cases has held that a profes-
sional degree earned during the marriage does not constitute marital
property subject to equitable distribution by the court.' 0 These
courts have refused to recognize a spouse's property interest in a pro-
fessional degree earned during the marriage on a number of
grounds," primarily because a professional degree lacks the tradi-
tional attributes of property. 2
A second group of cases has held that a professional degree and
its attendant increased earning power constitute a valuable marital
property interest that must be part of an equitable distribution. 3
cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed or pledged. An advanced degree
is a cumulative product of many years of previous education, combined with
diligence and hard work. It may not be acquired by the mere expenditure of
money. It is simply an intellectual achievement that may potentially assist in the
future acquisition of property. In our view, it has none of the attributes of prop-
erty in the usual sense of that term.
Id. at 432, 574 P.2d at 77.
10. See Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89
Cal. App.3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d
527 (1982). In both Aufmuth and Graham, the supporting spouse had realized the benefits of
her contributions to her husband's professional degree, and in both instances other marital
assets existed for equitable distribution. In Mahoney, although the court refused to find that
the supporting spouse held a property interest in the degree, it did award reimbursement for
the wife's contributions to the degree.
II. Courts frequently justify these holdings by stating that future earnings do not consti-
tute a vested present interest subject to distribution, that a degree is difficult to value, and that
the institution of marriage imposes obligations of mutual spousal support that by their very
nature are not recompensable. See Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App.3d at 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 678
("Since the philosophy of the community property system is that a community interest can be
acquired only during the time of the marriage, it would then be inconsistent with that philoso-
phy to assign to any community interest the value of the post-marital efforts of either
spouse."); Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 497, 453 A.2d at 532 ("The amount of future earnings would
be entirely speculative [and thus] ...would involve a gamut of calculations that reduces [the
figure] to little more than guesswork. ... ); Lehmicke v. Lehmicke, 339 Pa. Super. 559,
573-74, 489 A.2d 782, 790 (1985) ("The duty of support is imposed by rule of law on both
spouses. Compliance with this legal duty does not result in unjust enrichment to the other.")
(Wieand concurring).
12. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
13. See Daniels v. Daniels, 20 Ohio Ops.2d 158, 164, 185 NE.2d 773, 776 (1961);
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1985). The court in
O'Brien relied upon New York domestic relations law to define marital property as "property
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One court reasoned that marriage is an economic partnership" that
requires courts to recognize that, in a divorce proceeding, each
spouse has a stake in a share of the marital (partnership) assets ac-
cumulated during the marriage.
Finally, courts in some jurisdictions have held that a profes-
sional degree is not marital property 5 but that the attendant in-
creased earning capacity is a factor a court should consider in fash-
ioning a remedy. These courts reason that this remedy prevents
unjust enrichment of the supported spouse 6 and furthers public pol-
icy concerning family welfare.17 These jurisdictions have the problem
of devising an equitable remedy which reimburses the supporting
spouse for his or her contributions, and the question ultimately be-
comes to what extent the supporting spouse should be compensated
and how the court should value such contributions.' 8
acquired by either party or both spouses during the marriage and before the execution of a
separation agreement or the commencement of a marital action, regardless of the form in
which title is held." N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 236[B][l][c], [d] (Consol. 1979 and Supp.
1986).
14. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 582, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 553. The court
stated that:
[w]orking spouses are often required to contribute income as wage earners, sac-
rifice their own educational or career goals and opportunities for child rearing,
perform the bulk of household duties and responsibilities and forego the acquisi-
tion of marital assets that could have been accumulated if the professional
spouse had been employed rather than occupied with the study and training nec-
essary to acquire a professional license . . . [and] these contributions represent
investments in the economic partnership of the marriage and [the] product of
the parties' joint efforts, the professional license should be considered marital
property.
Id.
15. See DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Minn. 1981); Hubbard v.
Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
16. See Hubbard, 603 P.2d at 751 ("We are persuaded by the suggestion in the forceful
dissenting opinion in Graham that the doctrine of quasi-contract offers a remedy for a spouse
in [a divorce]. In addition to its observation that in other contexts (tortious injury, wrongful
death) the law recognizes and protects a spouse's interest in the earning capacity of the other,
that decision stressed the responsibility courts have to fashion extraordinary remedies to pre-
vent extraordinary injustice.").
17. In Daniels v. Daniels, 20 Ohio Ops.2d 158, 166, 185 N.E.2d 773, 776 (1961), the
court awarded alimony related to the future earning capacity of the husband because the wife
was custodian of a child with serious medical problems and was entitled to receive more than a
rehabilitative award.
18. See Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). The court held that
the dental license earned by the husband was property but that the measure of the wife's
interest in the property was limited to her contribution to her husband's degree. On appeal, the
Kentucky Supreme Court reversed and held that the degree was not property. Inman v. In-
man, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1983). Nevertheless, the court approved the reimbursement award
based upon the supporting spouse's contribution to the degree. Id.
DIVORCE
IV. Hodge v. Hodge: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was unable to resolve this is-
sue. Each of the foregoing approaches is represented in the court's
opinion in Hodge. A majority of the justices held that a professional
degree and accompanying increased earning capacity is not marital
property for purposes of equitable distribution, 9 but the court was
evenly divided as to whether the professional degree must be consid-
ered to determine the necessity for and the duration of alimony.2"
In rejecting the argument that a professional degree is marital
property subject to equitable distribution under the Divorce Code,
the majority in Hodge relied upon statutory rules of construction.
2 1
The court reasoned that the legislature had not intended to give
"property" a different meaning than its traditional definition.22 Fur-
thermore, the court stated that, even if it were to conclude that a
professional degree was property, the future earning capacity at-
tained as a result of that degree should not be part of an equitable
distribution. Because the Divorce Code provides that only assets ac-
quired during the marriage are so distributed,23 the court reasoned
that earnings acquired subsequent to the parties separation could not
be considered.
The primary disagreement among the justices was whether the
Divorce Code gave the judiciary broad discretion to tailor alimony
awards that would effectuate economic justice between parties who
had no other assets for equitable distribution. Justice Zappala rea-
soned that the Divorce Code provides only for rehabilitative alimony
and thus no other award is permissible, even to effectuate economic
justice.24 Justice Hutchinson 2  declared that this interpretation of the
Divorce Code was erroneous, stating that the legislative intent was to
19. Hodge v. Hodge, 513 Pa. 264, 269, 520 A.2d 15, 17 (1986).
20." In a dissenting opinion, Justice Larsen agreed with the majority that the professional
license itself was not property, but stated that the proceeds generated by the degree were
property. Using an economic partnership model, he theorized that a professional degree is the
fruit of the marriage unit's investment in career potential. Justice Larsen reasoned that society
benefits when a dissolved marriage is subject to a strict economic accounting in order to "in-
sure a fair and just determination and settlement of (the spouse's] property rights." Id. at 283,
520 A.2d at 25.
21. I PA. CONS. STAT. § 1903(a) (Purdon Supp. 1986) requires that words and phrases
be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved
usage.
22. Hodge, 513 Pa. at 269, 520 A.2d at 17.
23. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 401(e) (Purdon Supp. 1986) states in part that " 'mari-
tal property' means all property acquired by either party during the marriage
S. .. (emphasis added)."
24. The opinion was joined by Justices Nix and Flaherty.
25. The opinion was joined by Justice Papadakos.
92 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1988
give courts the flexibility needed to fashion a fair and just economic
resolution in circumstances when there are no other assets available
for equitable distribution."
V. Analysis
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Hodge clarifies
the court's position that a professional degree does not constitute
marital property for purposes of equitable distribution. The decision,
however, provides little guidance as to the interpretive and practical
problems of fashioning a remedy in situations where the increased
earning capacity of the degree-holding spouse is the only asset avail-
able for distribution. Pennsylvania courts must continue to rely upon
the conflicting precedent in this area.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court's approach in Lehmicke v.
Lehmicke,27 decided only months after that court's decision in
Hodge, illustrates that conflict. That court interpreted the Divorce
Code to allow the court to fashion an equitable remedy limited to a
reimbursement award in an amount approximating the supporting
spouse's contribution to the student spouse's professional degree. The
court, by a split decision, 8 overruled that portion of the trial court's
decision that awarded Mrs. Lehmicke a one-sixth share in her hus-
band's estimated future earning capacity. Relying upon a narrow in-
terpretation of property and refusing to acknowledge the supporting
spouse's contribution to the degree as an investment requiring con-
comitant return on capital,2 9 the court was satisfied that the requi-
26. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102 (Purdon Supp. 1986) provides in part:
(a) The family is the basic unit in society and the protection and preserva-
tion of the family is of paramount public concern. Therefore, it is hereby de-
clared to be the policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to:
(6) Effectuate economic justice between parties who are divorced or
separated and grant or withhold alimony according to the actual need
and ability to pay of the the [sic] parties and insure a fair and just deter-
mination and settlement of their property rights.
Justice Hutchinson stated that the legislature had intended that the contribution of one party
to the professional degree of the other party should be a factor considered both in equitable
distribution of marital property and in the determination of the necessity for alimony. Hodge
v. Hodge, 513 Pa. 264, 274-76, 520 A.2d 15, 19-22 (1986).
27. 339 Pa. Super. 559, 489 A.2d 782 (1985).
28. Justice Wieand concurred in the court's finding that the degree did not constitute
marital property, but dissented with respect to whether the Divorce Code provides for equita-
ble remedies to reimburse for support contributions while one spouse was in school.
29. See Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for
the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 U. KAN. L. REv. 379 (1980). Krauskopf discusses
the theory of Investment in Human Potential as a foundation on which to structure equitable
settlements in marriage dissolutions.
DIVORCE
sites of equity imposed by the Divorce Code were achieved in the
reimbursement award. The dissent would have refused even the re-
imbursement award, relying upon the argument that mutual spousal
support is required by law3" and is therefore not a consideration for
reimbursement.
The Divorce Code mandates that the family unit should be pre-
served and protected. 31 When a marriage no longer can be preserved,
however, the Divorce Code provides that its dissolution should result
in economic justice to the parties, ever cognizant that the primary
consideration should be the welfare of the family. The superior court
in Hodge determined that the Divorce Code has empowered the judi-
ciary to fashion an equitable remedy beyond reimbursement ali-
mony. That same court 2 in Lehmicke, by allowing only reimburse-
ment payments, contradicted its decision in Hodge, thus failing to
.provide guidance for future cases and failing to preserve family wel-
fare as mandated by the Divorce Code.
Mere rehabilitative alimony and reimbursement awards, as ap-
proved by the court in Lehmicke, do not provide sufficient amounts
to the supporting spouse who contributed to the attainment of the
professional degree. A lump sum award, based upon the degree-hold-
ing spouse's increased earning capacity, provides not only a sever-
ance of the marital ties inherent in long-term alimony, but it also
provides rehabilitative funds and enhances the welfare of minor chil-
dren in conjunction with traditional support payments.33 Such a rem-
edy also furthers the policy of judicial economy because it eliminates
additional proceedings necessary in long-term alimony cases.
VI. Conclusion
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Hodge v. Hodge
will have little authoritative impact. By failing to establish guidelines
for equitable remedies, the court has done a disservice to the divorce
masters and trial courts who must face these issues in the future.
Only time will tell whether these administrative and judicial bodies
30. Justice Wieand cited the Equal Rights Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution
for the proposition that the duty of mutual support is imposed by rule of law.
31. See supra note 26.
32. A different panel of justices participated in the decision in Lehmicke.
33. A review of the cases cited herein indicates that most frequently the wife is the non-
degree-holding spouse, and she is most likely to retain custody of children born of the
marriage.
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will formulate equitable remedies beyond reimbursement alimony
that will give primary consideration to the welfare of the family.
Margaret M. Yenkowski
